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RESEARCH AND THEORY
The industrial world of the 19th century
threw out desperate images of disease,
despair, and unimaginable horror. In his
Bitter Cry of Outcast London, Andrew Mearns
(writing in 1883) describes the city’s poor,
many thousands crowded together in
“human rookeries”. To get to them, he wrote:
you have to penetrate courts reeking with
poisonous and malodorous gases rising from
accumulations of sewage and refuse scattered
in all directions and often flowing beneath
your feet; courts, many of them which the
sun never penetrates, which are never visited
by a breath of fresh air, and which rarely
know the virtues of a drop of cleansing water
.... You have to grope your way along dark
and filthy passages swarming with vermin.
Then, if you are not driven back by the
intolerable stench, you may gain admittance
to the dens in which these thousands of beings
who belong, as much as you do, to the race
for whom Christ died, herd together (Porter
1997, p. 400).
The vast scale of these problems provided
a quite impossible task for governments. Yet
their urgency, highlighted by recurring
epidemics notably cholera, prompted urban
reform and also the first public health acts.
These introduced the power to order the
abatement of insanitary and unhealthy
conditions as the mainstay of local sanitary
practice, a power that remains with us to the
present day. Thus, in 1848, powers were
given to local authorities in section 1 of the
Nuisance Removal and Disease Prevention Act
to order the removal of “nuisances”; where
premises were in a “filthy and unwholesome
condition as to be a nuisance or injurious to
the health of any person” an order to remedy
the condition could be made. These powers
were first entrenched in English public
health legislation, and a few years later also
in Australia where colonial public health
laws were passed from the 1850s onwards.
The first Australian health act, the Health
Act 1854 (Vic), copied English legislation
closely and provided local councils with a
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range of powers to order the abatement of
nuisances, not defined but impliedly “things
of an offensive nature or likely to be
prejudicial to health” (s13).
Nuisances as a Response to Miasmas 
The focus in a health act on environments
that were noticeably unpleasant and
offensive (generally evidenced by their
smells) was an expression of the prevailing
idea about the way disease was spread
through the atmosphere. Offensive
conditions were unhealthy, it was said, on
account of the “miasmas” or “effluvia” or
exudation emitted by them. The visual and
the malodorous became a telltale sign of the
source of infections and things that were
offensive were by their nature also
prejudicial to health. The Marquess of
Landsdown, in introducing the Bill, said
that the causes of disease, notably cholera,
“were atmospheric; that it was influenced by
the exhalation of rivers, the currents of air,
and certain meteoric changes and
vicissitudes” (Hansard 1848, p. 614). This
view drove the Act and while miasmas as
the exudations or vapours emerging from
unpleasant conditions are no longer offered
as explanation for the transmission of
disease (it was recognised that seemingly
unpolluted water could still be a source of
disease, and later the germ theory took hold)
it remained a persistent idea (Halliday
2001). There are still echoes of it in the
order making powers of some Australian
states whose health acts continue to reflect
the language and the key ideas that go back
to the 19th century origins of public health.
But in some ways the miasmatic responses
proved correct: offensive conditions, such as
privies overflowing into water sources, often
signified the presence of bacteria, while
dung heaps attracted flies and other vectors
of disease. 
If miasmatic theory directed the public
health response it also had an important
secondary impact, since its focus was on
improving the environment and the
elimination, in the name of public health, of
the smells, the waste, the sources of water
pollution and the acrid smoke of factory
chimneys. In this respect our first public
health laws were also our first environment
protection laws. This point remains true
today, but in the 21st century the general
environmental surveillance offered by
public health powers has been
complemented, perhaps overshadowed, by
environment protection regulations that
comprehensively regulate and monitor areas
such as water and air pollution, the control
of waste and contaminated sites and noise.
All Australian jurisdictions have modern
and extensive environment protection laws
that impose substantial penalties and offer
administrative flexibility and a range of
options for dealing with the nuisances that
fall within them. Zoning controls, imposed
under planning laws, have also sought to
keep housing and industry apart, minim-
ising the daily impacts of nuisances on
peoples’ lives. 
Thus in many cases an environmental
health remedy runs parallel with an
environment protection remedy and either
might be applied to the many cases where
the complaint could relate equally to
environmental health or environment
protection. Further, local government
legislation also provides some remedies, also
in the form of order making powers, for
situations that are aesthetically or otherwise
undesirable and some of these powers might
also apply in cases where an environmental
health order could also have been made.
The overshadowing of the nuisance
abatement power by the new environment
protection laws might seem to erode its
importance, but it still remains a key public
health remedy in the health acts of
Queensland (s77 Health Act 1937); Victoria
(s39A Health Act 1958); Western Australia
(s182 Health Act 1911); the Northern
Territory (s4 Public Health Act 1952); and
New Zealand (s29 Health Act 1956). South
Australia (s3(2) Public and Environmental
Health Act 1987) and the Australian Capital
Territory (Dictionary Public Health Act 1997)
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use the term “insanitary condition” which
calls up similar ideas to “nuisance”. New
South Wales (s124 Local Government Act
1993) and Tasmania (s199 Local Government
Act 1993) rely on order making powers in
local government legislation which relate to
environmental health issues. The United
Kingdom, which first put nuisance powers in
place in 1848, has now transferred them to
environment protection legislation (s79
Environmental Protection Act 1990).
A case exists to reassess the scope and
value of the nuisance power. It now has
significant ‘legislative competition’ from
newer and more comprehensive
environment protection legislation and is
based on a flawed understanding of the way
disease is spread. Yet, if reformed and used
imaginatively, it also has the potential to
provide important remedies in
environmental health and remain a
significant component of public health law. 
The Scope of the Nuisance Power
It is remarkable that in an age of seemingly
constant legislative change and reform, the
language of our public health laws has
remained unaltered for so long. The
Queensland (Health Act 1937) and Western
Australian (Health Act 1911) definitions of
the term “nuisance” have changed little
since they were first drafted. Queensland
provides a list of things that might amount
to a nuisance when they are “injurious or
prejudicial to health”. Western Australia
also offers a very long list of circumstances,
which might amount to a nuisance, typically
in the cases where they are found to be
“offensive or injurious or dangerous to
health”. The nuisance power, as expressed in
the Victorian Health Act 1958 still captures
the essence of its original idea (which is
discussed below). A more modern approach
is taken in South Australia where an
insanitary condition includes premises that
give rise to a “risk to health” or whose
conditions cause “justified offence” and also
in the Australian Capital Territory where
the key ideas against which the condition is
tested are whether it amounts to “a public
health risk, damaging to public health or
offensive to community health standards”. 
Using Victoria as the example for a closer
analysis of the term, a statutory nuisance is
defined by s39A of the Health Act 1958
(Vic) as nuisances “which are, or are liable
to be, dangerous to health or offensive” in
respect of buildings, land, water, animals,
refuse, noise or emissions. Victorians have
lived with this phrase for nearly a century,
though in 1988, “offensive” was defined to
mean “noxious, annoying or injurious to
personal comfort”. The definition is
interesting since it seems both narrow and
wide at the same time. The idea of
“dangerous to health” sets a high test, and
appears to exclude a range of risks that
should be of concern even though they lack
the imminent threat implied by a danger.
The idea of “offensive” even with the
definition “noxious, annoying or injurious to
personal comfort” at first glance covers a
multitude of possibilities including concerns
relating to amenity or the need for orderly
planning.  
How are we to give shape to the limits of
the nuisance power, or its equivalent the
insanitary conditions power? There is much
case law ranging from the 19th century to
quite recent times that provides important
principles of its current scope and usefulness.
Most importantly, courts have usually come
to the term with an understanding of what
public health legislation is seeking to
achieve and, given the similar language in
both the English and Australian statutes,
the cases from both jurisdictions are worth
considering. 
The scope of the nuisance remedy was
delineated in the English case Queen v.
Parlby (1889) where the court commented,
in relation to “premises in such a state as to
be a nuisance” in the Health Act 1875:
we do not attempt to define every class of
case to which the first head applies [i.e. a
nuisance], but we think it is confined to cases
in which the premises themselves are
decayed, dilapidated, dirty, or out of order,
as, for instance, where houses have been
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inhabited by tenants whose habits and ways
of life have rendered them filthy or
impregnated with disease, or where foul
matter has been allowed to soak into walls 
or floors, or where they are so dilapidated 
as to be a source of danger to life and limb.
(p. 525).
A later case from New South Wales, ex
parte Harris (1902) also tended to limit the
application of the term, holding that
premises, which required alterations and
repair, did not amount to a public health
nuisance even if there was evidence that
they might be injurious to health. Rather
the premises had to be “decayed, filthy, or
impregnated with disease, or so dilapidated
as to be dangerous” (p. 197). So, here, the
court concluded (perhaps too narrowly and
possibly on account of Sir Matthew Harris
being Mayor of Sydney as well as a
prominent landlord) that a nuisance did not
exist even though there were problems with
the ventilation and the drains of the
premises. 
The statutory nuisance had to have a
sanitary significance and could not be relied
on to sustain orders in cases that were more
about the general unreasonable use of land.
In Great Western Railway Company v Bishop
(1872) water falling onto a public road was
found not to be a statutory nuisance. Lord
Cockburn said “[i]t is plain that the object
[of the Nuisance Removal Act] was to protect
the public health. ... I think that affords us a
guiding principle by which to construe this
Act, and that ‘nuisance,’ the general term
used in the Act, must be taken to mean a
nuisance affecting public health” (p. 552).
This view was accepted in later cases, thus
in Springett v Harold (1954) a house which
was in need of decorating (the walls and
ceilings were stained and peeling) was held
not to be a nuisance. Nor was an unsightly
rubbish tip where the health hazard was the
dumping of materials, such as builders’
rubble, that could injure persons using the
area (Coventry City Council v Cartwright
(1975)). The view that physical injuries do
not amount to a nuisance was upheld in R v
Bristol City, ex parte Everett (1999), which
involved a very steep set of stairs. The Court
of Appeal found that the scope of the term
“prejudicial to health” or “injurious, or likely
to cause injury to health” was not intended,
when the Act was drafted, to cover physical
injury and should not now extend to it,
notwithstanding that the term was now in
another Act (the Environmental Protection
Act 1990). Since the terms “nuisance” and
“insanitary condition” remain in health
legislation in Australia, and principally are
organised around sections and parts dealing
with sanitation, there is an even stronger
argument that this traditional interpretation
(that excludes its application to physical
dangers) will be applied here. 
The position in Australia reinforces the
English case law. In McLaughlin v Halliday
(1985) the Victorian Supreme Court held
that the term “offensive matter” as defined
in the Health Act 1958 (Vic) (“dust sludge
mud soil ashes rags waste matter filth blood
offal dung manure or any other material
which is offensive or likely to become
offensive.”) could not apply to cardboard
and paper waste. The court found that this
definition created a class of materials
“immediately identifiable as being offensive
in that they are essentially dirty or noxious
or noisome or essentially injurious to human
health, or inconvenient to human well-
being” (p. 53). But the principle may not be
universal and a statutory nuisance remedy
was allowed in Adams v Council of the Shire
of Taringa (1927) even though there was no
obvious health impact and the problem
seemed only to involve water that had
accumulated on the plaintiff ’s land. 
Air quality issues (notably smells and
visual pollution) whether of environment
protection or environmental health concern
have always been likely to amount to a
statutory nuisance or insanitary condition.
Miasmatic ideas were applied in this context
in Bishop Auckland Local Board v Bishop
Auckland Iron & Steel Company (1882)
where an accumulation of cinders and ashes
satisfied the court that a nuisance
“producing noisome effluvia” existed and
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therefore was injurious to human health.
Obvious air pollution, for example the
release of large quantities of smoke by a
brick kiln in circumstances that clearly
constituted a common law nuisance
(washing was soiled by smuts and the
amenity of the area was reduced) was
allowed as a statutory nuisance (McKell v
Rider (1908)). So was the release of
“quantities of black smoke [from a brewery]
as to be a nuisance” (Weekes v King (1885)).
Granted, the health impacts of air pollution
could often be quite significant, as seemed to
be the case in Whitehead v Victor Leggo
Chemical Company (1926) where the smoke
coming from the defendant’s factory
“appeared to be composed mostly of
sulphuric fumes”. The emission of noxious
and potentially toxic gasses as nuisances or
insanitary conditions also have a relatively
modern application in Caruso v Boucher
(1974), which involved the escape of
chloropicrin, a fumigant used in glass houses
and said to be “injurious to health or
offensive” within the meaning of s83(1) of
the South Australian Health Act 1935
(people complained of sore throats and
watering eyes). 
Organic smells also qualify as nuisances
and the early cases, if not the later cases,
were also shaped by miasmatic thinking. In
Malton Board of Health v Malton Farmers
Manure and Trading Company (1879) the
nuisance produced from the defendant’s
manure works was said to be injurious to
human health because the effluvia to which
sick persons were exposed might cause them
to become worse. Piggeries were also the
subject of orders (Banbury Urban Sanitary
Authority v Page (1881) and Burton v Bysouth
(1900)). Other cases where a statutory
nuisance was allowed include Bullows v J
Kitchen & Sons Ltd (1910) which involved
“very foul odours” coming from a noxious
trade establishment, which were widely
diffused and lasted for some hours and
Colville v Dale (1899) which involved smells
from a boiling-down works and bone-mill. 
Noise has also been the subject of an
insanitary conditions order and is
specifically included in a number of
statutory definitions of nuisance (Jurkovic v
Corporation of the City of Port Adelaide
(1979)). While in the United Kingdom, a
court accepted that the failure to insulate
premises from outside noise meant that they
were “in such a state as to be prejudicial to
health” (London Borough of Southwark v Ince
(1989)). 
Assessing the Term “Nuisance” in the
Light of Recent Case Law
Can we reconcile the cases and judicial
approaches to the term “nuisance,” or its
related term “insanitary condition,” in a way
that gives us a useful guide to the scope of
the power? We can conclude that the term
emerged from a focused understanding of
the visible environmental health issues of
the day. As Richards J said in R v Bristol City
Council, ex parte Everett (1998):  
When powers to take action against
premises that were “prejudicial to health” or
“injurious to health” were conferred by the
mid 19th century statutes, the object of
concern was plainly the direct effect on
people’s health of filthy or unwholesome
premises and the like: in particular, the risk
of disease or illness (p. 613).
However, a close adherence to the origins
of the term can lead to odd decisions that
are seen in some of the recent cases. In
Coventry City Council v Cartwright (1975)
putrescible waste was removed from the
dump, while builders’ rubble that might
injure persons as they walked across the land
remained. The waste, had it not been taken
away, might have constituted a nuisance, on
the traditional grounds that it was offensive;
the rubble, certainly the greater threat to
health was not a nuisance. Another case,
which illustrates this point, is the House of
Lords decision in Birmingham City Council v
Oakley (2003). The case involved premises
that did not have a hand basin in the toilet,
making it inconvenient for persons to wash
their hands, and in the case of children
perhaps making it unlikely that they would.
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The local justices saw this as a problem,
concluding that washing hands “is
important to good hygiene practices
especially with regard to the younger
members of the household” and more
particularly that “[i]t is unacceptable in the
interest of hygiene having used the WC to
expect persons to either: (a) wash [their]
hands in [the] kitchen sink or (b) cross [the]
kitchen to [the] bathroom as both of these
involve the risk of cross infection within the
kitchen area”. On this basis a statutory
nuisance order was imposed. 
The application of the statutory nuisance
power in this case was challenged and when
it reached the House of Lords a majority of
the Law Lords hearing the case decided that
the situation did not amount to a statutory
nuisance. They took the view that, though
unsatisfactory, the facilities were not in
themselves defective. If there was a
prejudice to health, this had nothing to do
with the state or condition of the premises;
rather it resulted “from the failure to wash
hands or the use of the sink or the basin after
access through the kitchen”. It was said by
Lord Slynn that “[t]here must be a factor,
which in itself is prejudicial to health. I do
not think that the arrangement of the rooms
... not in themselves insanitary so as to be
prejudicial to health falls within the [scope
of a statutory nuisance]” (p. 1943).
However, Lord Clyde who dissented found
that the circumstances were prejudicial to
health. “In the ordinary use of language it
seems to me that the state of premises may
include a deficiency due to the absence of a
facility or a particular positioning of the
facilities. ... There was clearly something
inadequate with the premises themselves so
far as health and hygiene were concerned”.
In his Lordship’s view it was reasonable to
conclude “that the risk of cross infection
which [the justices] feared was due to the
state of the premises” (p. 1952). 
The majority view in this case leads to the
odd conclusion that if the toilet smelt, that
would quite possibly be the basis of a
statutory nuisance order but if it lacked the
facilities necessary to protect health (the
hand basin) then that was not in itself a
nuisance. Such a conclusion goes against
good public health sense, which advocates
the provision of environments and facilities
to make ‘healthy choices easy choices’. A
technical interpretation such as this is only
in the interests of landlords who try to evade
their responsibilities to provide a safe and
sanitary environment for their tenants. 
However, in other respects the statutory
nuisance or insanitary condition power can
be read too widely. Its origins in nuisance
more generally and its focus on amenity
issues, perhaps given public health flavour
by the idea of “effluvia”, means that there is
always the possibility that environmental
health grounds will be used to provide an
environmental or amenity remedy or a land
use planning remedy, with the
environmental health nexus strained to say
the least. A good example of this is
illustrated by the South Australian District
Court decision Tavitian v Public And
Environmental Health Council & City of
Playford (2003) where an insanitary
conditions order was based on assorted
clutter in the appellant’s premises including
“garden waste, iron, timber, plastic, tyres,
dilapidated motor vehicle bodies containing
refuse and rubbish, motor parts, mattresses
and a variety of metal frames, tubing,
fencing materials and general refuse and
rubbish”. It was said to amount to an
insanitary condition “by reason of the fact
that: (1) the premises are so neglected that
there is a risk of infestation by rodents or
other pests; and (2) the condition of the
premises is such to cause justified offence to
the owner of land in the vicinity of the
premises”. The court took issue with the fact
that the order seemingly had been made on
the assumption that “a risk of infestation
necessarily resulted from the mere existence
of the accumulated clutter”. More
particularly, there was no evidence that the
premises were filthy “such as might, without
more, give rise to an inference of a risk of
infestation” (para 43). The fact that the
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premises were unsightly was not enough to
amount to an insanitary condition (para
49). Indeed, it was the appellant’s view
(which the court may have sympathised
with) that the “Council’s case against him
was a planning objection to his use of his
yard disguised as a public health objection”
(para 48). 
For the Future
The origins of the statutory nuisance and
the rise of environmental controls raise
significant questions for the future. The case
law suggests that the term is locked within
its historical sanitary context and could not
be applied in a range of new circumstances
where we might expect an environmental
health response. Should we continue with
the power, but remain mindful of the
constraints and the limits alluded to by the
courts? Should we continue to address
environmental health at all, perhaps
vacating the field and leaving
environmental health as the sole
responsibility of environment protection
agencies? Is there a case for an independent
environmental health approach and if so
what form should it take? This author
believes that the traditional values and ideas
that encompass the ‘environmental health
approach’ are worthwhile and should be
defended. An environmental health
approach is a holistic approach, reflected in
the training of its practitioners.
Environmental health draws links between
the social and the environment and those
complex relationships between history,
place and opportunity that so powerfully
shape people’s health and wellbeing, the
health and wellbeing of Aboriginal
Australians being a powerful case in point.
Our current environmental health practice
is also a ‘rich’ and a ‘deep’ discipline, the
product of a long tradition that urged, and
continues to urge, social and environmental
reform based on sound evidence drawn from
epidemiology, medical investigation and
social inquiry.
If the environmental health response is to
maintain its capacity to remedy
environmental health problems, is there
another way of crafting the power in order to
free it from its constraints while
strengthening the environmental health
focus of the remedy? In 2000 the National
Public Health Partnership released a
discussion paper that advocated a “risk
based” approach to environmental health
legislation (National Public Health
Partnership 2000). Rather than allowing the
Acts to provide a range of specific remedies,
it raised the possibility of having a concept,
“risk to health”, as the general idea or
“spine” around which the administrative
powers notably orders, or penalties should be
organised. A statutory duty lay at the basis of
this. It was a duty to avoid harm to health,
which might be expressed as follows: 
A person must not undertake any activity
that may result in harm to health unless the
person takes all reasonable and practical
measures to eliminate the possibility of that
harm occurring (National Public Health
Partnership 2000 part 6.3). 
Those who breached their duty might
then be subject to an order to abate or
remediate the problem. 
A duty expressed in general terms restates
the function of the public health acts,
namely to prevent situations that pose a
threat to human health. It should respond to
all of the concerns legitimately caught by
the nuisance or insanitary conditions
powers, insofar as these are grounded in a
concern for human health. Recognising that
health is broadly defined to include states of
“mental and social wellbeing” the adverse
impacts of a poor environment, of noise and
odour will, if justified, be calculated to harm
human health and the duty would extend to
these issues as well. But it would also cover
the situations that, for the reasons alluded to
in Birmingham City Council v Oakley (2000),
lie beyond the scope of the 19th century
sanitary concerns. Structures that are
inherently unhealthy, rather than defective;
premises that are dangerous in some way;
procedures that potentially pose a risk of
20 E n v i r o n m e n t a l  H e a l t h   Vo l .  4   N o .  4  2 0 0 4
Christopher Reynolds
harm such as colonic irrigation, solariums,
rapid detoxification and, most recently
‘sweat lodges’ (procedures that are not in
themselves regulated and whose operators
and promoters often are not licensed health
professionals); or cases where persons are
being exposed to tobacco smoke (if not
already covered by regulation) - all fall
within the general duty. The point is that
the duty and its order making power would
operate against a general principle rather
than within a defined area. 
Thus a general duty would provide a
remedy for the things that seem often to ‘fall
between the cracks’ and in these cases the
generic environmental health remedy
operates as a safety net. The duty and its
accompanying order could also cover cases
where persons with a communicable disease
might in some way be placing others at risk.
But there are other cases where it would not
be appropriate to issue an order. Such a case
might be a ‘fast food’ restaurant, where the
argument for issuing it is no more than that
the food is unhealthy, leading to obesity.
While obesity is an emerging environmental
health issue of great concern, the singling
out of one outlet makes no sense in dealing
with a multi causal and complex issue,
unless there is something in the restaurant’s
activities that makes it stand out from
others. The issue of obesity and high-energy
fast food is better dealt with through a mix
of health promotion strategies and
marketing controls and, where premises are
in breach of their existing responsibilities,
prosecutions or orders under the food laws. 
The duty could go wider again; the causes
of global warming and the problems that will
emerge from unsustainable lifestyles
together present our greatest identifiable
risk to health. Potentially, our
environmental health remedies, which
hitherto have been so local and limited in
their scope, might contribute towards our
response to these very significant problems.
The way it might contribute and the support
it might offer to other ‘whole of government’
policies such as sustainability can only be
speculated on at this stage. But the
recognition that our first order
environmental issues will have dire impacts
on human health must cause us to explore
how environmental health can help address
these questions. 
For all the reasons outlined above, the
duty has to cover a range of possibilities,
especially future possibilities and it must
necessarily be broad and general. It is not
possible to spell out its scope or its range,
rather we must allow the duty to ‘unfold’
and meet new issues as they arise.
However, on occasions it may also be
important to be more specific and to allow
authorities to declare particular risks to
health to fall within the duty or to
authorise the publication of codes or
guidelines that set out what amounts to
compliance with it in particular cases. It
may also be important to direct decision
makers to formal criteria when deciding
whether or not to issue an order. The
Australian Capital Territory provides for
this in s69(2) of its Public Health Act 1997.
Here the person issuing the order must
have regard to the number of persons
affected by the problem, its significance
(the degree of risk, damage or
offensiveness that it presents), the extent
to which the person responsible for the
problem has taken reasonable precautions
to “avoid or minimise [its] adverse effect”
and the reasonable precautions that
persons adversely affected have or have
not taken to “avoid or minimise [its]
effect”.  
The duty must also be enforceable. First,
by the power to issue an abatement or
compliance order and to specify the
requirements for compliance, and second,
with sanctions that apply for failure to
comply with the order. The National
Health Partnership Report also envisaged
statutory offences for creating a risk to
health, where the risk was significant and
harm occurred or might have occurred as 
a result. 
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Conclusion
Over the past 10 years Australian
governments have invested resources and
energy into reviewing public health law
and while issues such as HIV/AIDS and,
more recently, the possibilities of
bioterrorism and emerging pandemics have
occupied much of this work, the sanitary
origins of our laws should not be
overlooked. The case for continuing a
human health directed ‘gaze’ on our local
environments remains strong. But there is a
need to rethink and modernise the basis on
which environmental health can act and
the remedies that it can offer. A generic
approach offers a more relevant and versatile
option, which can continue the legitimate
concerns of 19th century environmental
health but not be imprisoned by them. 
Endnote
1. A note on the terminology: in this paper ‘public health’ tends to be used in relation to the
legislation and the historical development of the discipline. ‘Environmental health’ is
used more generally since it reflects the current interest and description of the work of
practitioners in the field. In many respects the terms are interchangeable, with the latter
being a more contemporary version of the former.
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